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CNL – the early years 
It is 1966. The Soviet Luna 9
makes the first controlled
spaceship landing on the Moon.
John Lennon announces that the
Beatles are more popular than
Jesus. Mao Tse Tung’s Little 
Red Book is published. England
wins the football World Cup at
Wembley Stadium. And the 
first CERN Computer Newsletter
is circulated! 
To celebrate CNL’s 40th
anniversary, we look back at
some of the highlights and
historical curiosities of the early
years of computing at CERN, as
reported in the newsletter.
Why was there a need for CNL? 
“As computing becomes a more
and more widespread and
complex activity in the
laboratory, the need will
increase for a means to have a
wider general circulation of
background information about
different aspects of computing
activities than is possible with
the present system of Computer
Notices.” (February 1966, from
the introduction to the first
issue by G R Macleod, the leader
of the Data Handling division
from 1964 to 1975.)
Ancestor of the Helpdesk
“The Enquiry Office […] has had
to cope with enquiries on both
our installed machines and also
to adapt themselves to the
rapidly changing demands due
to the running on outside
computers.” (March 1966) 
“The principal purpose of the
office is to help programmers in
obtaining useful results from the
computers. Advice is given on
such topics as speeding up
programs, better use of
magnetic tapes as well as on 
the problems of debugging.
Suspected machine faults are
analysed and discussed with the
CDC engineers.” (February 1967)
CERN’s first computer expires
“The Ferranti Mercury [...] has
now been dismantled […] The
computer was the first to be
installed at CERN and remained
as the only machine until the
arrival of the IBM 709 in 1961.”
(July 1966)
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The Ferranti Mercury was CERN’s first “central” computer. It was
installed in building 2 on 30 June 1958. The Mercury’s performance did
not compare to the simplest of today’s pocket calculators. Its clock
speed was a modest 1 MHz and its RAM capacity was 2000 20-bit words.
Editorial
2 CERN Computer  Newsletter  • January–March 2006
The end of Fortran?
“● FORTRAN: FORmula
TRANslating. The most commonly
used program language exists in
many versions e.g. CERN Fortran.
● ALGOL: From Algorithm. A more
advanced language now available
on many computers but rarely
efficient for production work. 
● PL1: The new programming
language specified by the IBM
users’ organization (SHARE) 
and IBM to supplant Fortran.”
(April 1966)
Un problème de traduction
“Le Comité d’Etude des Termes
Techniques Français nous prie
de soumettre à l’appréciation de
nos lecteurs spécialisés dans le
calcul automatique le choix des
termes français proposés en
remplacement des termes
anglais hardware et software […]
“HARDWARE: équipement




avec le terme précèdent,
désigne tout ce qui vient
s’ajouter aux calculatrices
électroniques pour permettre,
faciliter, assouplir et accélérer le
traitement de l’information. 
“Cet ensemble comprend,
notamment, les relèves d’un
double jeu de mots en anglais.
L’acception banale de hardware
est quincaillerie et c’est par
plaisanterie que ce mot est
appliqué à la partie matérielle
d’une calculatrice. Le mot
software fait contraste avec
hardware (hard = dur; soft =
mou) pour désigner ce qui, en
dehors du matériel, est
indispensable au fonctionnement
de la calculatrice. 
“Traductions proposées: […] 
1) hardware = MATERIEL 
2) software = PROGRAMMAIRE
ou PERIGRAMME.” (June 1967.
Articles were sometimes written
in French in the early days.)
Online in the swinging sixties
“FOCUS is the acronym for a
Facility for On-line Computation
and Updating Services. It is a
project to give an improved
computing service for the on-
line users. These users are the
groups who require data link
connections between their 
own satellite computer and the
large central computers.”
(September 1967)
CERN computing and democracy
“The following press
announcement was made
concerning the use of the CDC
3800 for the election data
processing. 
“Meyrin-Genève: un
ordinateur du CERN, un CDC
3800, a effectué le
dépouillement électronique des
bulletins de votations des
Elections fédérales suisses au
Conseil national et au Conseil
des Etats. Cette opération faisait
partie d’un contrat entre
l’Administration cantonale
genevoise et l’Organisation
Européenne pour la Recherche
Nucléaire.” (November 1967)
Not quite the Web
“ITIRC, IBM Technical
Information Retrieval Center,
has developed an evolutionary
computerized textual




of special tools such as index
listings, bulletins, KWOC, etc…
This is to service within IBM, its
multithousand international
community of line and staff
personnel.” (April 1968)
GUI, seventies style
“Over the last six months there
have been two additions to the
types of graphics devices
connected to the central
computer installation. The
FOCUS system has had three
Tektronix T4002 storage tube
displays added as terminals, and
a Ferranti ARGUS 500 computer
with a refreshed display,
keyboard, tracker ball and light
pen has been attached to the
6600. For these devices the user
writes his program for the 6600
using the graphic software
system GD-3 […] the file can be
returned to FOCUS where the TV
command allows the user to
view the output on the T4002
screen. In the latter case the
user may expand a part of the
picture, superpose pictures or
compare frames side by side.”
(November 1970)
A computer centre is born
“At the Finance Committee on
12th February 1970 two
adjudication papers were
presented concerning the new
computer building […] The
adjudications were for the 
air-conditioning plant, and the
civil engineering work. The
building will be about 75 m long
by 50 m wide, with three floors
above ground level and a
basement, and will be built close
to the new CERN restaurant on
the South side of the site
between the ISR and the PS.”
(March 1970) 
“The nearly completed new
computer building, building
513, which will house the CDC
7600 computer system, is
located in the French site
sandwiched between the new
restaurant and the booster.”
(January 1972)
The newly built computer centre, building 513, as it looked in June 1972.
The CDC 3800 was used to process
Swiss election data in 1967.
The CDC 6400 with control console
(centre) and tape decks (right).The front page of one of the early issues of CNL, dated 14 March 1966.
Announcements & news
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Computing featured in 
this month’s CERN Courier 
The articles listed below appear
in the January/February 2006
issue of CERN Courier. Full-text
articles and the rest of the
issue’s contents are available
at www.cerncourier.com.
Computing News
● ETICS assures quality on the Grid
EU-funded project will improve
the coherence of Grid software.
● Grid researchers get one online
identity
A new Grid federation will give
scientists access to global data.
● Python developers swap ideas
News from the 2005 EuroPython
conference in Göteborg, Sweden.
● SC|05 showcases high-energy
computing
Grid scientists flock to Seattle.
● CNL is 40 years old
Early days of computing at CERN.
● Meeting highlights Grid potential
CERN and UNESCO host event.
● Middleware has two important
additions
NMI-R8 eases resource security.
● W3C improves features for
transforming and querying XML
W3C issues recommendations.
IT products and calendar
Feature articles
● Tackling the challenge of lattice
QCD
Fermilab’s commodity solution
for lattice QCD goes online.
● Towards a read–write Web
Security efforts by LCG and EGEE
unite the Web and the Grid.
● Globus Toolkit upgrade aids the
Grid community
GT4 offers major improvements
in terms of performance.
The network database is 
a key element of the CERN
network infrastructure. It is
essential that its information is
kept up to date, for security
reasons and to ensure the
smooth running of the network
infrastructure. Over the years
some of the information in the
database has become obsolete;
the database therefore needs to
be cleaned up, for which we are
requesting your help.
In the coming weeks you may
receive an e-mail from Netops.
database@cern.ch relating to
the clean-up. If you receive such
a message, it will be for one of
the following reasons:
● You are responsible for or are
the main user of a system for
which a problem has been found. 
● You have been the supervisor
of a person who has now left
CERN (according to the Human
Resources database). 
● The problem has been passed
up to you because someone
under your supervision has not
taken the necessary action
within four weeks of notification.
Just open the link that will be
included in the message and
follow the instructions. Thank
you in advance for your help.
IT Department, Communication
Systems and Network Group
● The above article was also




Two more of CERN’s experimental
facilities have been added to the
tours offered by the Visits
Service. The public can now visit
the COMPASS experiment and
the Computer Centre.
The Computer Centre has
always been a popular place to
bring visitors, and the growing
public awareness of CERN’s Grid
activities is increasing the
demand. More than 1000 people
passed through during CERN’s
open day in October 2004, and it
was one of the most popular
options on the site.
The first batch of guides has
now been trained. During the
tour, visitors will find out more
about the development of the
Grid and its importance to CERN
and the global scientific
community. Visitors will also be
able to appreciate the amount of
computing power required to
process data from the Large
Hadron Collider, by comparing
their own PCs with the thousands
of new desktop computers.
The Visits Service now offers
seven sites. For more details,
refer to http://cern.ch/visits.
Computer Centre opens to the public
From 16 January, Windows XP
NICE installations (both new
computers installed and old
computers re-installed) will no
longer grant administrative
privileges by default to the main
user or to the person
responsible for the computer.
Administrative privileges
enable the user to perform
administrative actions, such as
installing new applications or
changing system settings. Until
now these privileges have been
enforced each time machines
are rebooted, but this risks
compromising the computer
every time a code from an
unknown source (e.g. e-mail
attachment) is executed.
To enable users to continue 
to install software and change
system settings on their
computers, a shortcut called
NiceAdmin in the Start/
Programs menu will offer a
means of performing certain
tasks that require administrative
privileges, but only on demand.
Users with valid reasons to be
a permanent administrator for
their machine will still have this
option. However, users who
wish to benefit from this
increased security proactively
without reinstalling their
computer can already sign up for
the project. More information
and the enrolment procedure
can be found at: http://cern.ch/
WinServices/docs/nonadmin.
The NICE team
NonAdmin tackles Windows security
The messenger of the gods
brings CERN a new service for
hosting multipoint remote
meetings. HERMES is operated
by CERN together with IN2P3,
CNRS and INSERM. 
HERMES relies on a Codian
40-port Multipoint Control Unit/
videoconference bridge and is
similar to the ESnet ECS 88
service. It enables high-quality
conferences that can be
managed with great flexibility.
Current IP connectivity will be
supplemented in January with
ISDN (video) and traditional
telephone capabilities. 
The service includes advanced
features such as Web streaming
of conferences (using either
RealPlayer or Quicktime) and
individual selection of the
conference display style. Soon it
will also be possible to book
videoconferences from the
Indico interface.
Information about the service






The CERN openlab student
programme is open for
applications from bachelor,
master and Ph.D. students in
computing and physics. 
Successful applicants will
spend two months at CERN this
summer working on cutting-edge
Grid-related technology projects.
They will receive training in all
aspects of Grids from LCG, EGEE
and CERN openlab staff. 
Check www.cern.ch/openlab
for details. Candidates should
send a CV and letter of support
from a supervisor to Francois.
Grey@cern.ch. The closing date
for applications is 31 March.
Students invited to apply for openlab 
Submitted by Tim Berners-Lee 
12 December 2005 at http://dig.
csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/blog/4:
“In 1989 one of the main
objectives of the WWW was to be
a space for sharing information.
It seemed evident that it should
be a space in which anyone could
be creative, to which anyone
could contribute. The first
browser was actually a browser/
editor, which allowed one to edit
any page, and save it back to
the web if one had access rights. 
Strangely enough, the web
took off very much as a
publishing medium, in which
people edited offline. Bizarely,
they were prepared to edit the
funny angle brackets of HTML
source, and didn’t demand a
what you see is what you get
editor. WWW was soon full of
lots of interesting stuff, but 
not a space for communal
design, for discource through
communal authorship.
Now in 2005, we have blogs
and wikis, and the fact that they
are so popular makes me feel I
wasn’t crazy to think people
needed a creative space. In 
the mean time, I have had the
luxury of having a website which
I have write access, and I’ve
used tools like Amaya and Nvu
which allow direct editing of web
pages. With these, I haven’t felt
the urge to blog with blogging
tools. Effectively my blog has
been the Design Issues series of
technical articles.
That said, it is nice to have a
machine to the administrative
work of handling the navigation
bars and comment buttons and
so on, and it is nice to edit in a
mode in which you can to
limited damage to the site. So I
am going to try this blog thing
using blog tools. So this is for
all the people who have been
saying I ought to have a blog.
Thank you for the comments.”
Submitted 19 December 2005: 
“Oops! Thanks for all the
wonderful welcoming comments.
We’ve had rather a lot, and had
to turn the comments off on the
first blog. I can’t answer them all,
but I would point out one thing.
I just played my part. I built on
the work of others – the Internet,
invented 20 years before the
web, by Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn
and colleagues, for example, and
hypertext, a word coined by Ted
Nelson for an idea of links which
was already implemented in
many non-networked systems. 
I just put these technologies
together. And then, it all took 
off because of this amazing
community of enthusiasts, who
have done such incredible things
with the technology, and are still
advancing it in so many ways.
By the way, this blog is at DIG,
the Decentralised Information
group at MIT’s CSAIL. I intend it
to be geeky semantic web stuff
mostly. For example, it won’t be
for W3C questions which should
be addressed to working groups.
So thanks for all the support,
no need for more general ‘thank
you’ comments! Thank *you* all.”
Announcements & news
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EU funds EGEE-related projects
One of the primary goals of the
Enabling Grids for E-sciencE
(EGEE) project is to integrate
thematic and national Grid
projects to support the rapidly
emerging European Grid
infrastructure. EGEE has
therefore always had close
relations with other Grid
initiatives such as DEISA, SEE-
GRID and DILIGENT. 
The EU has recently funded
many new projects in areas that
are closely related to the work
of EGEE. These projects can be
sorted into three categories:
infrastructure, application and
support (see figure). 
Infrastructure projects work in
two ways: either they provide
new sorts of infrastructure (such
as the DEISA supercomputer
Grid), or they extend existing
Grid infrastructure and network
capacity to new geographical
regions. This regional model for
infrastructure extension is now
also being adopted for China,
the Mediterranean area, the
Baltic States and Latin America. 
Application projects use the
Grid infrastructure to serve
various goals but also help to
understand the requirements of
users and feed these back into
the Grid development. Two new
application projects, Health-e-
Child (computationally intensive
research in paediatrics) and
BIOINFOGRID (bioinformatics),
will soon come online.
Support projects include
initiatives that will contribute to
the development of the Grid,
enhancing the impact and
effectiveness of infrastructure
and application projects. The 
e-Infrastructures Reflection
Group (e-IRG) receives support
in the form of the e-IRG Support
Project. ISSeG (led by CERN) will
work in the area of site security
for Grid computing. BELIEF will
help European Grid projects to
develop contacts worldwide with
industry, while the ICEAGE
project aims to advance
education about the Grid. ETICS
(led by CERN), will bring
together facilities for software
configuration, integration,
testing and benchmarking to
enable developers to ensure the
quality and compatibility of their
products. (See also “ETICS
assures quality on the Grid”



























Ongoing, new and proposed projects that are funded by the EU.
Tim Berners-Lee starts blog for ‘semantic stuff’
Sir Tim Berners-Lee and his blog (photomontage).
Desktop computing
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Web authoring is the action of
editing a website’s content,
typically using Web-authoring




confidentiality and to protect
user passwords from possible
theft, all Web-authoring actions
will be required to use
encryption as of 15 February.
The instructions about using
FrontPage or Dreamweaver have
been modified accordingly on
the CERN Web Services site at
http://cern.ch/web. All users
are encouraged to apply the new
instructions immediately. 
Here are some questions and
answers about this change. If
you need more help, please
contact the helpdesk or
web.support@cern.ch.
Who does this change concern?
All persons who use FrontPage
or Dreamweaver to edit a
website that is hosted centrally
by CERN Web Services.
Why is this change taking place?
Authoring a website requires
that you supply your user name
and password. If the Web-
authoring application does not
use a secure, i.e. encrypted,
communication channel to
connect to the Web server, there
is a risk that your password 
may be stolen. By requiring an
encrypted communication
channel, your password is
protected from theft.
How does it affect me?
From 15 February it will not be
possible to author a website
with FrontPage or Dreamweaver
without using encryption. 
Whether or not encryption 
is used depends on how the
website is opened in your Web-
authoring application. This
means that you may have to
change the way you open your
site in Dreamweaver or
FrontPage if you do not yet 
use encryption.
This change affects only the
use of FrontPage or Dreamweaver
to edit a website. There is no
impact on the actual website, its
functionality or its contents.
How to ensure encryption is used?
● FrontPage: start FrontPage, go
to the File menu, Open site… and
type the URL https://mysitename.
web.cern.ch/mysitename (note
the “s” in “https”), then click
“Yes” if a security alert appears
(figure 1).
● Dreamweaver: change your




For more details, read the
online instructions about using
FrontPage or Dreamweaver to
edit a website on http://cern.ch/
web/docs/AuthDoc/EditWeb. 
Note that both FrontPage and
Dreamweaver remember how
you last edited your website, so
that you can re-open the
website more quickly the next
time. It is likely that your current
shortcut or site definition is not
using encryption. 
As a result, you have to fully
follow the instructions at least
once to create new shortcuts 
or site definitions that use
encryption, before you can use
the shortcuts again.
Why do I get a security alert with
FrontPage?
To encrypt communications 
with the Web server, FrontPage
uses the HTTPS (Secure HTTP)
protocol. HTTPS communications
require that the Web server
provides a digital certificate that
proves its identity. If FrontPage
cannot verify the Web server’s
identity, a security alert is
displayed to the user.
Since HTTPS supports only
one identity per Web server, the
Web server always identifies
itself with its actual name 
(e.g. webh01.cern.ch) even if a
website is opened in FrontPage
using the website’s name (e.g.
mysitename.web.cern.ch).
FrontPage detects this name
mismatch and shows the
security alert. You can click
“Yes” to proceed. 
How do I remove the security alert
in FrontPage?
For the security alert not to
appear, the website must be
opened in FrontPage using the
name of the actual server that is
hosting your website. The server
name is visible in your website’s
properties on http://cern.ch/web.
For instance, if the website
mysitename is hosted on server




FrontPage. This will match the
name on the digital certificate
that proves the server identity,
and the alert will not reappear. 
Note that the actual server
name for your website can
change from time to time. Please
refer to your website’s properties
for the latest information.
FrontPage seems to freeze when I
open my website.
Sometimes FrontPage may
appear to freeze when you try to
open a website. It is actually
waiting for you to click on the
security alert message box that
is hidden by the main FrontPage
window (figure 2). 
The solution is to use the task
bar to bring the hidden message
box to the front.
What will happen if I try to connect
without using encryption?
After 15 February, if you do not
use encryption your Web-
authoring software will report
that it cannot find your website.
What should I do if Dreamweaver
shows the following error message:
“The desired action could not be
completed because an unexpected
client/server communication error
occurred” (figure 3)? 
You are probably trying to
connect without encryption.
Follow the instructions from
http://cern.ch/web/docs/
AuthDoc/EditWeb to open your
website using encryption.
What should I do if FrontPage shows
the following message: “The folder
‘http://test-frontpage.web.cern.ch/
test-frontpage’ isn’t accessible. 
The folder may be located in an
unavailable location, protected with
a password, or the filename
contains a / or \” (figure 4)?
See answer to previous question.
I cannot open my site in FrontPage
from Internet Explorer.
The Edit with Microsoft Office
button in Internet Explorer will
not work anymore, because this
feature does not use encryption.
Alexandre Lossent, IT/IS
CERN enforces Web-authoring
encryption to ensure security
Fig. 1 (left): security alert from
FrontPage. Fig. 2 (above): use
the task bar to bring the hidden
message box to the front.
Fig. 3: Dreamweaver message when connecting without encryption.
Fig. 4: FrontPage message when connecting without encryption.
LCG news
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The Large Hadron Collider (LHC)
experiments will generate huge
amounts of data, and special
methods will be needed to
analyse them efficiently. No
single computer will be able to
crunch the data in a reasonable
amount of time.
The only way to cut analysis
time to an acceptable level is to
use parallelism. Depending on
the amount of data, parallelism
can be employed on multicore
laptops, local clusters or global
distributed clusters, i.e. the Grid.
The challenge will be to provide
this parallelism transparently so
that users won’t have to worry
about how to access all of these
resources in parallel.
The ROOT framework
From the mid-1990s, the ROOT
system was developed to offer
the functionality needed to
handle and analyse large
amounts of data. ROOT, which is
an object-oriented framework,
offers an extensive set of tools
for data storage, analysis and
presentation. The data are
defined as objects, and special
storage methods are used to get
direct access to the separate
attributes of the selected objects,
without having to touch the bulk
of the data. The system was
designed to query its databases
in parallel on parallel-processing
machines or on computer clusters. 
ROOT is the preferred data
analysis environment for the
LHC experiments, so the ROOT
team has increased its efforts to
provide a system that will give
efficient access to many
computers in parallel.
PROOF provides transparency
The Parallel ROOT Facility
(PROOF) enables distributed data
sets to be analysed interactively
in a transparent way. It exploits
the inherent parallelism in data
from uncorrelated events via a
multi-tier architecture that
optimizes I/O and CPU use in
heterogeneous clusters with
distributed storage. Being part
of the ROOT framework, PROOF
inherits the benefits of a
performant object-oriented
storage system, and statistical
and visualization tools.
PROOF requires the analysis
to be run via “selectors” that
contain user code that is called
by the PROOF worker nodes.
PROOF opens the ROOT files
that are to be analysed and tries
to optimize the data-access
patterns so that workers read
data locally or via the high-
performance xrootd file servers.
Since many PROOF selectors
typically are I/O bound, the
efficiency of the data-access
infrastructure largely determines
the efficiency of the system.
Selectors are a universal way
of processing ROOT files and can
be run transparently in a local
ROOT session or on a PROOF
cluster. Selectors can be
interpreted with CINT or compiled
on the fly with the ACliC
mechanism (ROOT’s transparent
C++ compiler interface). The user
code in the selectors can access
experiment or user shared
libraries, which can then be
uploaded, compiled and installed
with the PROOF package
manager. This mechanism
enables PROOF cluster nodes to
have a different architecture,
operating system or compiler
from the platform on which the
user developed the code.
Suitable for long-running jobs
Initially PROOF was developed
purely for interactive analysis,
with queries lasting no more
than several tens of minutes and
operating in synchronous mode
– i.e. the lifetime of a PROOF
session was determined by that
of the client session. We have
recently extended PROOF to
support the “interactive batch”
mode, in which a user can close
the local client session while the
PROOF query continues to run
on the remote cluster. The user
can later reconnect to the
PROOF cluster to inspect
progress or get the results of
finished queries. 
The advantage of using
PROOF for long-running jobs
(instead of splitting the analysis
into multiple-batch jobs, each
running over part of a data set)
is that the selector and analysis
model does not change
depending on the length of the
query or the size of the data set.
This means that a more dynamic
and interactive monitoring of the
intermediate results is possible.
PROOF can also be distributed
over several sites if data sets
span more than one site. In this
case, PROOF has to operate 
with the Grid file and metadata
catalogues, and authentication
and job-submission systems. 
Typically, a user will query 
the file catalogues for a data 
set to be analysed. The location
of the files in the data set
determines where PROOF worker
nodes have to be started by the
Grid job-submissions system.
Once the PROOF worker agents
are started, the user’s client
session will connect to the
master and the queries can be
executed (see figure). A
prototype of this model, which
combines AliEn (the ALICE file
catalogue and job-submission
system) with PROOF, was
demonstrated at the 2005
Supercomputing conference.
This year the ROOT team will
improve PROOF and help the
LHC experiments to integrate it
into their analysis and Grid
environments. 
Further information
● ROOT – http://root.cern.ch;
● xrootd – http://xrootd.slac.
stanford.edu;
● CINT – http://root.cern.ch/
root/Cint.html;
● AliEn – http://alien.cern.ch.














guaranteed site access through
PROOF submasters calling out
to master (agent technology)
Grid service interfaces
TGrid UI/Queue UI




of logical files (LFN + MSN)
slave servers access data via
xrootd from local disk pools
ROOT
Multi-tier PROOF architecture with the client talking to a master, the master talking to the submasters, and
each submaster talking to a group of worker nodes. In a Grid environment the location of the submasters
and workers will be determined by the location of the data files that are to be analysed.
PROOF will analyse LHC data
TRIUMF, Canada’s national
laboratory for particle and
nuclear physics, will host a 
Tier-1 centre for the ATLAS
experiment. By 2008 the centre
will include 1900 kSI2k of CPU
power, 1000 TB of disk storage
and 730 TB of tape storage.
Funding has been requested
from the Canada Foundation for
Innovation. A review is
scheduled to be held in January
2006, and a decision is expected
by February.
Canada’s current involvement
in the LCG includes developing
and deploying middleware for
the Grid. In particular, TRIUMF,
which is located in Vancouver, is
hosting several LCG site/cluster
solutions. These include: 
● a modest, fully fledged local
LCG cluster; 
● a gateway that unites
resources at Canadian
universities and makes them
accessible to LCG as one site,
via a computing element that
uses CondorG technology (this is
a unique Canadian initiative, see
www.gridX1.ca); 
● a development cluster that 
is dedicated to the service
challenges on which LCG
baseline services are deployed
and tested. The main focus at
TRIUMF last year was to set up
the components to participate in
all aspects of LCG Service
Challenge 3, such as disk-to-disk
and disk-to-tape transfers
between CERN and TRIUMF, and
disk-to-disk transfers between
TRIUMF and several Canadian
universities that were acting as
Tier-2 centres; 
● a distinct LCG executor based
on CondorG (and hosted by
TRIUMF and Simon Fraser
University), which has doubled
ATLAS’s overall capacity for
production and job submission
on the Grid. This was crucial to
complete the Monte Carlo
samples that were needed for
last year’s ATLAS Physics
Workshop, held in Rome. 
The networking resources are
provided by CANARIE, and at the
moment comprise 2×1 Gbit/s
dedicated lightpaths that were
made available in spring 2005
and used in Service Challenge 3
last summer. A 10 Gbit/s line is
now being commissioned and
should be available in the first
quarter of 2006. 
In June 2005 a temporary
10 Gbit/s lightpath between
CERN and TRIUMF was available
for several days. This lightpath
was used for various transfer
tests. A sustained transfer rate
of 2.33 Gbit/s was achieved. 
R Tafirout, TRIUMF; MCVetterli,
Simon Fraser University/TRIUMF  
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Patricia Mendez Lorenzo is part
of the LCG Experiment and
Integration Support Team at
CERN. Normally she supports
ALICE, helping LCG sites to install
and run the ALICE software. But
last summer she was assigned
an additional task: to help gridify
satellite imagery applications for
UNOSAT, a United Nations
initiative that provides the
humanitarian community with
access to satellite imagery for
use in crises such as
earthquakes and tsunamis. 
CERN has hosted the UNOSAT
team for the past four years, so
that it can benefit from CERN’s
substantial IT infrastructure and
Internet access. Tapping into
CERN’s Grid know-how was
another reason, and last year 
a summer student project,
supervised by Mendez Lorenzo
and Einar Bjorgo of UNOSAT,
provided an ideal opportunity to
push forward on this front. 
With Sean Moran, a student
from Cambridge University, they
began by transferring some
3.5 TB of data on the Asian
tsunami to the CASTOR storage
management system. They then
set up a software infrastructure
to enable the UNOSAT team to
access the data using standard
LCG tools. At the same time,
Mendez Lorenzo and Bjorgo
created a virtual organization 
for UNOSAT, with a view to
extending this to other sites
around the globe that UNOSAT
collaborates with. In this way, in
future this sort of data can be
stored in a truly distributed way. 
With members of the ARDA
project, led by Massimo
Lamanna, Bjorgo and Mendez
Lorenzo implemented metadata
applications that enable stored
data to be searched according to
geographical co-ordinates. They
also interfaced computer-
intensive UNOSAT programs to
LCG. These programs can heavily
compress satellite images for
transmission over low-bandwidth
connections to relief workers in
the field. Mendez Lorenzo has
continued to test these Grid
applications and was invited to
present the results at a workshop
during the 1st IEEE International
Conference on e-Science and
Grid Computing in Melbourne,
Australia, in December.
“Gridifying an application like
this from zero is gratifying,” said
Mendez Lorenzo, “because you
get to develop the whole
infrastructure and see
applications run in a relatively
short time.” The UNOSAT team
is equally enthusiastic, and is
already planning the next stage
of this development project – to
adapt more of the UNOSAT
software suite to the Grid – with
Mendez Lorenzo and LCG.
François Grey, IT/DI, CERN
CERN’s Patricia Mendez Lorenzo and UNOSAT’s Einar Bjorgo have adapted satellite imagery tools to the Grid.
Canada’s TRIUMF is home to ATLAS Tier-1 centre
Grid technology helps UNOSAT to 
tackle humanitarian challenges
Ten years ago control systems
were restricted to dedicated
processes that had sparse
interconnectivity with other
systems, if at all. The hardware
was based on proprietary
technologies, and
communication protocols were
custom designed or came from
only one or a few vendors. As
such, the control systems were
completely (or mostly)
separated from the rest of the
world and only reachable by
means of a few dial-up modems. 
From the point of view of
security these systems were
safe (“security through
obscurity”), since only a few
experts had knowledge of the
protocols and methods used,
and outside connectivity was
low. Major threats were insiders
(e.g. disgruntled employees)
who might target the control
system for personal gain, or
users who badly configured the
system. However, a recent
analysis reports that today the
dominance of internal fraud is
rapidly being replaced by
threats created externally [1].
During the 1990s, in parallel
to control systems, standards
based on Ethernet and the
TCP/IP protocol were introduced
into information technology (IT)
networks. Because of their
openness and ease of use, these
networks spread around the
world and became the standard
for office and business networks
as well as for use at home. 
However, with this openness,
and because no software or
operating system is free of
flaws, there was a downside in
the form of “war dialling”,
“backdoors”, password sniffing
and cracking, and the hijacking
of user sessions. 
These threats, which started
in the mid-1990s, became more
sophisticated. As hackers
accumulated knowledge, new
viruses and worms automated
the attacks. Today IT is faced
with Internet Relay Chat (IRC)-
based intrusions, denial-of-
service attacks, botnets and
zombie machines, which can
strike with a synchronized 
attack from hundreds of
machines around the world.
Control systems join IT networks
Many control systems are now
undergoing a change towards
modern IT-based solutions, with
common IT standards being
applied to control systems and
networks. Proprietary field
buses are being replaced by
Ethernet and TCP/IP. Common IT
protocols such as SNMP, SMTP,
FTP, Telnet and HTTP are being
used to share data from control
systems with data warehouses,
the upper management levels
(“from top floor to shop floor”)
and the outside world. More and
more sensors, actuators and
other field devices are being
connected to this network. 
Furthermore, commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) IT hardware now
enables virtual private network
(VPN) access from remote
locations (e.g. from home) to the
controls network, and permits
wireless communication with it. 
On the user interface side,
operator consoles and
Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems are
now based on the Microsoft
Windows platform or are ported
to a standard Linux installation.
Notebooks and USB sticks have
become new means to monitor
and configure control systems. 
Controls are open to attack
However, the rise of modern IT
in control systems and networks
also has drawbacks. The close
interconnectivity between
controls and office networks
enables viruses and worms to
spread more easily to control
systems. Remote VPN or wireless
access, notebooks and USB
sticks offer new possibilities for
a virus or worms to enter the
controls network. Not to
mention hackers and terrorists
who might be interested in
targeting controls computers to
shutdown the system. 
Since Microsoft’s Windows
operating system is now the 
de facto platform for SCADA
applications, the corresponding
control PCs inherit the same
vulnerabilities that office PCs
have. Linux-based controls PCs
do too. Unfortunately controls
PCs cannot be patched and
updated as fast as office PCs,
and some might even lack
antivirus software because of
interference with the control
processes. Even if these PCs are
secured, zero-day exploits might
enter before the proper patch or
virus signature file is available
or applied. 
Users and operators of control
systems are the next weak link.
First they might carry infected
notebooks into the control room
or connect their infected home
PC to the controls network via
VPN. Second, in the era of legacy
control systems passwords were
known to many people and still
are. These passwords might also
be weak, in the sense that they
consist of a few letters only or
can be found in a dictionary. For
convenience, passwords might
even be written on a sticker and
fixed directly onto a terminal. In
addition, many applications still
use the default password or may
have no password at all. In the
past, traceability was guaranteed
owing to the restricted group of
people that had access to the
control system, but with the new
interconnectivity, password
sniffing can be done remotely
and automatically.
Last but not least, COTS
automation systems such as
programmable logic controllers
(PLCs), power supplies and
other field devices generally
have no security integrated into
their designs. Of a range of 
such devices tested at CERN
with a standard IT security
scanner for vulnerabilities, more
than 30% failed to communicate
properly [2]. Even worse,
manufacturers are including
more and more IT functionality
(like e-mailing and Web servers)
into these devices, which is
reducing security even further. 
CNIC presents mitigation strategy
More than 110 different control
systems are now operational or
under development at CERN.
These systems monitor, control,
supervise and safeguard CERN’s
accelerators, experiments and
infrastructure – from buildings,
electricity and heating to access
control, radiation protection and
safety. Many systems use
today’s standard technologies
mentioned above. The
corresponding PLCs, VME crates
and PCs that run Linux, LynxOS
or Windows operating systems
are connected to CERN’s local-
area network (LAN) using the
TCP/IP protocol in one way or
another. However, apart from
the range of IP numbers, no
clear distinction has been made
Technical briefs
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A ‘defence-in-depth’ strategy to
protect CERN’s control systems 
ICALEPCS 2005, where the CNIC working group presented its policy
document on protecting CERN’s control systems from cyber-attacks.
Technical briefs
9CERN Computer  Newsletter  • January–March 2006
between office and controls
applications, neither for
networking nor configuration.
To refine the use of control
systems at CERN and to offer
methods to protect them, the
working group called Computing
and Network Infrastructure for
Controls (CNIC, see http://
wg-cnic.web.cern.ch/wg-cnic)
has produced a security policy
document [3]. This document






October. The document follows
closely the best-practice
standards that are used
increasingly in industry, and, to
achieve an acceptable level of
protection, follows a “defence-
in-depth” approach. Here is an
outline of its recommendations:
● Separation of the controls
networks (i.e. dedicated networks
for accelerators and experiments)
from the office network, and
additional segregation of the
controls networks.
The CERN LAN now consists of
two different physical networks:
the General Purpose Network
(GPN) and the Technical Network
(TN). The former is used for all
office (campus) computing and
for development, while the latter
is used to run the control
systems for all accelerators (AB
and AT departments), for safety
precautions (the safety
commission), and for site-wide
monitoring (the TS department).
They were fully separated, in
terms of interconnectivity, on 
9 January. 
Four additional networks are
planned or have been installed
for the LHC experiments ALICE,
ATLAS, CMS and LHCb. More
dedicated controls networks
might be envisaged for fixed-
target experiments. Inside each
network, further access
restrictions, such as local
firewalls and network filtering,
will enable the protection of
sensitive equipment.
● Channelled paths to access
controls networks remotely, and
rules for handling notebooks,
wireless and VPN connections –
to protect these controls
networks from outside threats. 
Access to each of these
controls networks is restricted.
Direct data exchange is inhibited
except for a few “trusted”
central IT services such as DNS,
NTP, AFS, DFS and Oracle DB.
However, users are guaranteed
access through Linux and
Windows-based application
gateways, which require proper
authorization. The use of
wireless access, VPN access and
notebooks on a controls network
are generally prohibited.
Wireless and VPN accesses are
still possible from the GPN
through the corresponding
application gateway. 
● Procedures to register devices
being connected to a controls
network, to manage control
systems under the responsibility
of the users, and to intervene in
the case of a security incident.
For each controls network,
one or more domain managers
have been appointed to
implement and follow up the
CNIC security policies and adapt
them where necessary. The
managers authorize devices that
need to be connected to a
controls network. For this, each
device must be properly
registered in the network
database that is managed by
IT/CS (http://networking.cern.
ch). The domain managers also
follow up security incidents with
CERN’s Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT).
● Methods to secure controls
PCs and to centrally manage the
installation, patching and
upgrading of their operating
systems and application software




procedures for Windows and
Linux PCs are inappropriate for
controls PCs, since they leave
little control to the user in terms
of what to install and when to
reboot the PC. To mitigate this,
the IT/FIO and IT/IS groups have
developed new tools named
Linux for Controls (LinuxFC) and
Nice for Controls (NiceFC). 
Each user can create one or
more sets of PCs and take over
the responsibility of these. For
each set, the user can define
precisely which centrally
managed operating system and
which application software
should or might be installed,
and for which applications
installation is denied. The users
keep full control of when these
applications are applied and
when to reboot the PCs. 
Furthermore, no automatic
patching or upgrading will be
carried out. Instead, the
manager of a targeted system
will receive e-mail notification to
apply the patches as soon as
possible. However, although
patching is not automatic,
failure to apply a patch within a
defined time limit may lead to a
PC being disconnected from the
network if it poses a risk to the
overall integrity.
● Rules on user accounts and
passwords to enforce traceability.
Users are often the weakest
link in the security chain,
especially owing to their choice
of weak passwords. Furthermore,
generic accounts (e.g. operator
accounts) that are used to
operate control systems are not
bound to one person, and the
corresponding passwords are
frequently known to many
people. The CNIC policy requires
users to employ strong
passwords. It also imposes a
verification of all generic
accounts and their removal
where possible. In any case,
traceability must be guaranteed
in every case, e.g. through
physical access protection.
● Raise awareness of security
issues in the users community.
Security starts with users, so
CNIC has launched an awareness
campaign to inform all users of
control systems of the possible
risks and threats. CNIC also
organizes weekly users
exchange meetings, where
problems are discussed and




CNIC-related issues and offers a
platform to discuss problems
further. Every user of control
systems at CERN is encouraged
to join one of these activities.
Conclusion
With the adoption of modern IT
standards by control systems,
and the subsequent growing
interconnectivity between
campus networks and control
networks, control systems have
become exposed to the same
weaknesses that threaten
computer security. However,
most control systems are not
able to defend themselves
against such cyber threats.
Therefore, the CNIC working
group has produced a security
policy document that proposes
various means of mitigating an
attack. In particular, all control
systems at CERN must be
properly secured by a “defence-
in-depth” strategy. Users of
control systems are invited to
participate in this discussion. The
threat is real, and so the primary
question must be “Do we act
before or after an incident?”
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A computer simulation of the control centre for CERN’s Large Hadron
Collider. The centre is expected to be operational by 1 February.
The autumn 2005 HEPiX meeting
was held at the Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center (SLAC) on
10–14 October. Confirming the
trend from last year, the US
meetings now attract as large an
audience as European meetings
– more than 80 this time from
some 27 institutes in Europe
and North America. 
The meeting, which was
impeccably organized by Chuck
Boeheim and colleagues,
comprised a day of sessions on
collaboration tools, followed by
three days of “normal” HEPiX
sessions, and finally a half day
of talks on hardware issues. 
Collaboration tools day
The first day was a review of
some common collaborative
tools, highlighting possible
trends in videoconferencing in
particular. The talks included
some from non-typical HEPiX
speakers who had stopped at
SLAC on their way to an ESnet
conference in Berkeley. 
The afternoon session was
largely drawn from information
gathered by RTAG12, a
requirement technical
assessment group of the LHC
Computing Grid project. The
session included a summary of a
report by the RTAG12 chairman,
who closed his talk with
personal suggestions on how to
move forward on the report’s
recommendations. There was
also a talk on how to select the
most appropriate electronic
document management system
tool for the International Linear
Collider study.
The following collaborative
tools were presented: Wiki (at
GSI, Darmstadt, and at FZK,
Karlruhe); the Form Factory tool
being built at DESY; the Indico
tool developed at CERN; the
Skype peer-to-peer telephony
system over IP; the Access Grid
high-performance video
conferences, which are widely
used in the UK; the collaborative
tools in NICE at CERN (such as
WebDAV access to DFS, and
Windows Terminal Services); the
Virtual Room Videoconferencing
System; VACS, the home-written
management system that is
used in France; and the Web-
hosting services at CERN.
HEPiX session highlights
The following are a selection 
of other highlights from the
meeting. Please note that not all
sessions are covered, and points
are in no particular order. More
details can be found on the SLAC
website(www.slac.stanford.edu/
conf/hepix05/agenda.html).
● Collaboration was evident
throughout the week, with many
system and sysadmin tools
appearing in laboratories across
the HEP community; for example,
Scientific Linux, Quattor, dCache
and Xrootd. At HEPiX came the
first indication that CERN’s
monitoring tool, Lemon, may be
the latest package to be of more
general interest.
● As at the last meeting, most
sites reporting CPU farm
increases are buying Opteron
systems – BNL and CERN being
exceptions. In this area, an
interesting set of benchmarks
performed at GridKA on different
processors was reported on the
final day (see SLAC website).
● At a batch workshop follow-up,
Tim Bell presented some changes
made following input at the last
HEPiX meeting. Francesco Prelz,
the main Enabling Grids for 
E-sciencE (EGEE) batch system
developer, then presented his
open questions, which resulted
in a productive exchange and a
plan to move forward on a topic
that has been unresolved for
some time. It was agreed to
follow this up at the next
meeting. Francesco said he felt
the session had been valuable,
and that HEPiX had provided a
welcome forum to make this
happen. The HEPiX board has
agreed to make this happen in
CASPUR and perhaps in future
meetings as needed.
● Regarding Linux, Fermilab
proposed that we consider
making HEP code comply with
Linux Standards Base. There
was a discussion about
differences and compatibility
between Scientific Linux (SL)
and Scientific Linux CERN (SLC).
Some concern was expressed
that CERN, unlike other labs,
had issued its tailored version of
SL as a formal SLC release. It
apparently confuses some users,
at least those outside CERN,
who are associated with LHC
experiments. CERN either needs
to reconsider this branding or to
advertise better what it is, why
we do it, and the fact that it is,
or should be, binary-compatible
with the SL from Fermilab.
● An interesting set of sessions
was held on disk and storage
systems, including DPM, SRB,
Xrootd, dCache and Panasas. 
Comments 
All CERN talks from the Internet
Services groups included a live
demo. While this is not always
possible (Hege Hansbakk
thought of doing one for Licence
Monitoring, but off-site access to
the pages is forbidden), it should
be considered where possible.
The organizers made a
deliberate effort to schedule
several talks that were targeted
at the physics that is happening
or is planned to take place at
SLAC, rather than at our usual
range of only computing
subjects. These additional talks
(given by the director, Richard
Mount, and by an astrophysics
theorist) were quite interesting,
and the last one in particular
was entertaining.
Trip report
For those who are interested, a
more detailed report about the
HEPiX meeting is stored in
Indico. Also, the SLAC HEPiX
Report (summary and slides)
that was presented at the joint
Computing/After-C5 seminar 





The next meeting will be at
CASPUR in Rome, Italy, on 3–7
April. The autumn meeting will
be held at the Jefferson Lab.
Alan Silverman, IT/DI 
Conference report
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US HEPiX attracts large audience
Participants at the autumn meeting enjoyed talks on collaboration tools, CPU benchmarks, Linux, and disk and storage systems among others.
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Techniques used by spammers
evolve continuously and are
becoming very clever. Last
December CERN was attacked by
a malicious e-mail in which the
user was invited to access a
URL. By selecting the URL some
users have infected their PCs
with a virus. Unfortunately there
is no reliable way to distinguish
a fake e-mail from a real one.
Below we provide some
guidelines to help you recognize
whether an e-mail should be
considered suspicious. 
What should I check?
Read the text carefully.
● Does it contain account-
specific data (such as the real
[first] name or physical location
of a network device)?
While most of these data can
probably be gained from some
publicly visible information, it is
much easier for a legitimate mail
sender (with direct access to
CERN’s internal databases) to
obtain such information. As you
can see in the example, the
message was not precise,
referring to “your account”
(without any indication to which
machine and login it was
referring to at CERN), and “for
security reasons” (without
giving any further explanation).
● Look for small errors in titles
or names. 
In the example, the signature
is given as “Cern Security
Department”, which does not
exist (it is the CERN Computer
Security team). 
These indicators should be
enough to make you suspicious
about an e-mail already. 
Suspicious URL
A good way to check if a URL is
what it claims to be is to type it
(do not cut and paste it) into
your browser. However, most
mail clients have features that
are easier to use.
● If you read your mail (HTML
format) on NICE using Outlook,
or on Linux using GNOME
Evolution, pause the cursor over
the highlighted URL. Check if the
real URL that appears in a yellow
box (in Outlook) or in a status
bar at the bottom of the screen
(Evolution) looks trustworthy. In
the example, the URL pointed to
a strange address outside CERN. 
● If you use pine and hit return
next to the URL, the real URL will
appear at the bottom of the screen
along with a request to confirm
that you really want to go there.
Suspicious attachment
If the suspicious mail comes
with an attachment, another
good indicator is whether the
right “tool” (file format) is being
used for the message: 
● A short notification is best
handled by plain text.
● A complex, multipage
document will probably arrive as
a .doc or .pdf attachment. 
● Unless you are expecting a
collection of binary files that
only make sense together (so
adding them as individual
attachments won’t work), a .zip
file is highly suspicious.
On Windows, it is strongly
recommended to save
attachments before viewing
them, because a virus scan is
automatically performed when
saving the file. This is true even
for attachments that come from
someone you trust, as their
computer may be infected.
Fighting this problem
The IT department is investigating
further techniques to combat
spamming. There are ways to
fight these bogus e-mails but
this means imposing stricter
rules, which will eventually lead
to less convenience for users;
the challenge is to find the right
balance. Meanwhile we have to
rely to some degree on users
being proactive and suspicious.
As was written in the last issue
of CNL, in case of doubt users
should ask the helpdesk before
taking any action. 










According to our terms of services, you will have to confirm your
e-mail by the following link, or your account will be suspended
within 24 hours for security reasons.
http://www.nicole.cremel@cern.ch/confirm.php?account=cern.ch
After following the instructions in the sheet, your account will not
be interrupted and will continue as normal.
Thanks for your attention to this request. We apologize for any
inconvenience.
Sincerely, Cern Security Department
The deadline for submissions to the next issue of CNL is 
3 March
E-mail your contributions to cnl.editor@cern.ch
If you would like to be informed by e-mail when a new issue of CNL is available, subscribe to the mailing list
cern-cnl-info. You can do this from the CERN CNL website at http://cern.ch/cnl
Changes to services in the IT
department are published on the
Service Status Board (SSB),
which is located at http://cern.
ch/it-servicestatus. The most
recent changes and their dates
of posting are shown below. The
SSB also includes power cuts,
scheduled interventions, service
incidents, and the status of most
services. A dynamic page with
the status of most services is
also available at http://cern.
ch/itservicestatus/dynamic/.
Information corner
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Oracle database administrators
recently attended two training
courses on the latest 10gR2
release of the software. The





and IT/DES (Database and
Engineering Services).
The main motivation behind
the courses was to offer experts
in database administration high-
quality training that would match
their demanding job. Another
asset was to give participants
the opportunity to get certified
in Oracle 10g and thus to receive
recognition for their skills, even
outside the organization.
The first course was held on
2–4 November and was designed
for people who passed the Oracle
9i certification last year. Eleven
people attended: five from IT/DES,
four from IT/ADC (Architecture
and Data Challenges), and two
from IT/AIS (Administrative
Information Services).
The second course, which
took place on 7–11 November,
was designed for people who
did not have the Oracle 9i
certification. Seventeen people
attended it: three from IT/DES,
four from IT/ADC, three from
IT/AIS, four from IT/FIO (Fabric
Infrastructure and Operations),
two from IT/CS (Communication
Systems), and one from TS/CSE
(Technical Support Department,
group “Controls, Safety and
Engineering Databases”).
Both courses were held at the
Oracle Training Office, at the
World Trade Centre, Geneva.
The attendees thanked the
organizers who made this event
happen. These Oracle 10g
courses will undoubtedly help
the newly certified database
administrators to continue to
address the evolving needs of
the database users’ community
and to improve the overall
quality of the many CERN services
that are based on Oracle.
CERN Technical Training
services provides a complete
curriculum on Oracle, called the
Oracle Training Curriculum @
CERN. You will find information
about dates and registration on













































































The organization of the Oracle Training Curriculum @ CERN.
Recent changes to IT services
18 November 2005 Oracle Forms 6i migration to Forms 10g (summer 2006) 
19 December Restrictions on the CERN VPN service 
15 December e-MAPS form is available in EDH 
12 December EDH – new options: “Confidential” and “Urgent” in the DAI document 
25 November New tutorials for EDH 
25 November New profile for user accounts in DEVDB 
21 November AIS-NICE login synchronization 
21 November Change in EDH Material Request form
17 October NICE login is mandatory for all operations via the network Web interface 
14 October TCP and UDP port 3372 blocked in firewall 
Calendar
February 
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3–7 HEPiX meeting 
Rome, Italy
www.hepix.org
25–29 20th IEEE International
Parallel and Distributed
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Paper deadline 20 February
August
29–1 September Euro-Par 2006
Dresden, Germany
www.europar2006.de





Paper deadline 13 March
October
25–27 eChallenges 2006 
Barcelona, Spain 
www.echallenges.org
Paper deadline 28 February
The CNL team wishes you a
happy New Year for 2006!
IT database staff gain
Oracle 10g certification
